Democracy and Political Transitions: The Risks of Elections for the Implementation of Peace Agreements
by Fabio Andrés Díaz
Colombia, elections, leadership, peace constructing, social division
August 13, 2018
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Ivan Duque took over as President of Colombia on 7 August. Following his arrival, a number of questions have been raised about the sustainability and implementation of the Colombian peace process with the FARC-EP.
Earlier statements by President Duque on the peace course of and agreements are recognized: he was an lively member of the marketing campaign that promoted the referendum of October 2 towards the peace agreements when the Colombians rejected peace agreements, and he was the senator of the right-wing Democratic Social gathering, who successfully opposed Santos's outgoing authorities ; he promised to "check" and "correct" the peace agreements.
Speeches during the Opening Ceremony increase broader questions on the position of the new President and the new Congress in the continuation of peace agreements. This was on account of the dissonance between the President's discourse and the discourse of the Senate President. When President Duque requested for unity and for solving the issues of peace agreements and for their implementation, the speeches made by the future president of the Senate (together with the Centro Democrático celebration) reminded us of a debate that began as a conflict nation. When he tried to go away one – he described Colombia as a rustic of chaos, which was virtually a destroyed nation, and demanded the restoration of laws and order. President Duque's time period brought an virtually schizophrenic message calling for unity, and a right-wing debate describing the previous eight years of the former President Santos as a failure.
The solely widespread aspect in President Duque's discourses and the Senate chief was Senator Uriben (former president in 2002–2010) with nice praise. Nor was there any praise or recognition for any of the actions of the Santos authorities, but both targeted on Uribe's character and character (the most distinctive determine in Colombian politics over the past 50 years). Colombian policy continues to be highly hereditary.
The implementation of the peace process continues to be ongoing: 39% of the parts of the peace agreements between the State of Colombia and the former FARC-EP haven’t yet been carried out. (now FARC). Three situations can subsequently be thought-about in the mild of the discussions at the opening:
- Separation between the Social gathering (Centro Democrático) and the government (Duque presidency)
President Duque was voted with over 10 million votes. about 6 million. So as for the authorities to have the ability to symbolize the voice of the upcoming four million voters, the government might be more average than the Centro Democrático celebration. Colombian Vice President Marta Lucia Ramirez has publicly recommended that this distinction between celebration and authorities takes place.
If this state of affairs happens, implementation of the peace agreements is more likely to face challenges in terms of unlawful crops, and a legal basis for the transitional interval. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Duque Peace Agreements could possibly be bought to conservative areas as "concessions" that needed actual peace in the country.
Robust opposition to the implementation of a number of initiatives may be expected. peace treaty, but since most parties (with the exception of Centro Democrático) supported the implementation of the peace agreements, their implementation must be continued
- Discussion in the middle, right
Suppose Duque's government doesn’t need to transfer into historical past as a government that has did not adjust to a peace treaty that would to burn violence and proceed to recycle armed teams in Colombia, the government and the president might use a "politically correct" strategy. In this case, the president might strengthen the implementation of the agreements and peace-building in the nation, while the congress does not comply with the implementation of the treaties. This can be as a consequence of the undeniable fact that Congress has a statutory regulation that has to satisfy the remaining 39 % of the provisions of the peace agreements that haven’t yet been carried out, or the allegations of lack of funding and refusal to approve funding
. failure and the Congress might weaken its obligations between the totally different events or use the challenges of contract implementation as a justification for their actions. For instance, since there are spoilers in the FARC-EP, some members of Congress might justify the failure of the FARC-EP to comply with the treaties, which justifies additional delays in the implementation and financing of demobilization and thus will increase the quantity of cadres in the new armed groups
On this case, we anticipate critical restrictions on the Colombian Fact and in the financing and operation of the Special Mission for Peace, whereby implementation of the agreements shall be halted by delays related to technical laws and testing the endurance of cadres.
- Jail Dilemma Strategy
The ultimate state of affairs is that accepted stances and discourses have extra contact with future native elections in 2019 than with peace agreements. Nevertheless, they could have an impact on the implementation of peace agreements. As Centro Democrático strives to strengthen its power in native elections in 2019, it’s credible that they may continue this tactic of two interactions, presenting President Duque's reconciliation tone and a extra militaristic tone from Centro Democrático members.
This strategy has proved to be useful and efficient; it provides them the alternative to broaden their voting base and give them the alternative to problem provincial and municipal control next yr. In accordance with this two-track communication strategy, Centro Democrático might have the ability to transmit two messages with out creating any dissonance with its potential voter. Social media instruments have their very own Choice Filters, which might permit this without main problems: the right-hand voter might not see or take heed to discourses like Duque middle and vice versa.
The challenge is how you perceive the implications of election techniques for the implementation of peace agreements. The victory of the Centro Democrático in the 2019 elections would imply the arrival, consolidation or return of actors who don’t consider in peace agreements, land redistribution, transitional justice and the proper to protest; this is able to finally delay the implementation of peace agreements not only in Congress but in addition in the local and provincial governments (we should not overlook that the implementation of the peace process is designed as an area course of)
in order that citizens and social organizations can’t in any means deny the end of power crossing. FARC and EP and Colombian government to precise state necessities.
In the two above-mentioned situations, peace is a high danger. If the first state of affairs occurs, the country might decide to peace by introducing wider political variety in its institutions: both excessive left and right-wing events are represented in Congress, this variety displays the political opening of the transition.
Duque's chairmanship is outlined as happening besides when Colombia celebrates its 200th anniversary of independence, but in addition its means to satisfy the promise of peace
Categories: Conflict and security Latin America Social cohesion
Tags: Colombia, elections, management, peace building, social division